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Abstract
The 2010s was a busy decade for the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the first shipping 
season to feature the international use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a signifi-
cant reform of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the Polar Code. The traffic has 
gradually picked up, and although the expectations of a significant surge in trans-Arctic navigation 
have not materialized, the NSR’s annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set by the 
USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to find the most optimal means of develop-
ment of the NSR, the latter has recently been re-marketed as a Polar Silk Road, part of the grand 
Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. While Russia has been rebuilding its military presence in 
the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting 
strong political, but yet not legal, response. 
 The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention to the Russian 
State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the NSR. By describing the cur-
rent status and identifying some of the regulatory trends, the article will draw cautious predictions 
on the role of the law of the sea in the management of the NSR in the near future.
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1 Introduction
The 2010s (1 January 2010–31 December 2019) was a busy decade for the North-
ern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the first shipping season to feature interna-
tional use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a significant reform 
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of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the International Code for 
Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code).1 Shipping traffic has gradually picked 
up, and although the expected significant surge in trans-Arctic navigation has not 
yet materialized, the NSR’s annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set 
by the USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to find the most optimal 
means to develop the NSR, the latter has recently been re-branded as the Polar Silk 
Road (PSR), part of the grand Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While Russia 
has been rebuilding its military presence in the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH 
Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting a strong political, but not 
yet legal, response.
It is common to consider 1 January 1991, when the 1990 Regulations entered 
into force,2 as the date of the formal opening of the NSR to foreign vessels. Although 
this was certainly a milestone political decision, it did not result in revolutionary 
changes regarding actual use. It seems that falling cargo turnover in the decades 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union was just another victim of the abrupt economic 
transition within the country. It would be difficult to expect a surge in foreign ship-
ping through the NSR when the domestic cargo turnover plummeted approximately 
fourfold between 1987 and 1998.3
At the same time, Russia’s hesitance to tailor national legislation to truly accom-
modate international interests effectively discouraged international use of the NSR.4 
The cost of obligatory services and other burdensome requirements on ships criti-
cally hindered the prospect of the commercial viability of this route.5 
However, the NSR was never officially closed to international shipping, at least de 
jure.6 In line with the biblical wisdom “you will know them by their fruit”, one may 
as well view 2010 as marking the real opening of the NSR. After all, it was the first 
shipping season that featured international use of the NSR for commercial purposes 
(by and for foreigners, i.e., by foreign-flagged ships and/or for shipping to/from a 
foreign port), preceded by the exploratory voyages of the MV Beluga Fraternity and 
the MV Beluga Foresight in 2009.7 
In the 2010s, Russia set its course to convert the NSR into a route of global 
significance for world trade, an international artery able to compete with other tra-
ditionally used seaways in all respects.8 The development of the NSR has remained 
a priority for Russia’s maritime policy, as set out in the 2001 Maritime Doctrine,9 
as well as the revised version adopted as the 2015 Maritime Doctrine.10 The doc-
uments that articulate Russian Arctic policy, such as the 2008 Basics of Arctic 
Policy,11 the 2013 Arctic Development Strategy12 and the 2020 Basics of Arctic 
Policy13 all emphasize the significance of Russia’s national interests concerning the 
NSR, the need for centralized management, and the provision of non-discriminatory 
access to the NSR, including for foreign vessels.14
The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention 
to Russian State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the 
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NSR. To that goal, the article aims to address the following question: What trends 
in the development and implementation of Russian Arctic shipping regulations can 
be observed in the last decade? Through describing the trajectory of the regulatory 
approaches, the article will draw cautious predictions on the role of the law of the 
sea in the management of the NSR in the near future. As such, the 1 January 2010 – 
31 December 2019 period is approached as a focal point, rather than a frame strictly 
limiting the scope. Whenever necessary, and sometimes incidentally, the article will 
hence cover some legal developments that took place before or after the said period. 
The next Section gives an overview of the relevant law to facilitate further dis-
cussion and unveil some of the trends in the past decade. Section 3 focuses on the 
main trends in the regulation of navigation for commercial ships, with attention 
to the operation of the permit scheme, fees for services, and enforcement of non- 
compliance. Section 4 investigates the inward-looking concerns of economic pro-
tectionism and national security, as reflected in legislative activity. Section 5 briefly 
presents the NSR’s alter ego, the Polar Silk Road. The last Section sums up the dis-
cussion and aims to extrapolate the trajectory a little further.
2 The legal status of the NSR
2.1 The NSR in Russian legislation 
The most critical legislative change in the legal regime of the NSR in the last decade 
was the adoption of the 2012 Federal Law,15 which amended the 1995 Federal Law 
on Natural Monopolies;16 the 1998 Federal Law on the IWTSCZ;17 and the 1999 
Merchant Shipping Code.18 The last enactment serves as the legal basis for the 
establishment of the Administration of the NSR (ANSR)19 and a dedicated set of 
navigation regulations, the 2013 Rules.20 
2.1.1 The pivotal role of the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code 
As a result of the 2012 legal reform, the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code has achieved 
a pivotal role in the domestic legal regime of the NSR. Article 5.1, entitled “navi-
gation in the water area of the NSR,” is central to the legal regime of the NSR, as 
it provides the parameters for the regulation of navigation, operation of the ANSR, 
permit scheme, and fees.
There is an important implication for the scope of application of the dedicated set 
of navigation regulations – the 2013 Rules, based on Article 5.1.1 of the Merchant 
Shipping Code. Under Articles 1–2, the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code regulates 
relations arising out of merchant shipping only. Article 3(2), moreover, explicitly 
exempts State-owned vessels from the application of the 1999 Merchant Shipping 
Code.
The decision to anchor the 2013 Rules in the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code, thus 
rendering them applicable only to commercial ships, represents a departure from the 
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earlier policy of non-discrimination between commercial and State-owned vessels. 
The 1990 Regulations applied to all ships. This was both controversial and likely to 
create inconsistencies with Article 236 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).21
According to Article 236, the provisions of UNCLOS regarding the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, such as Article 234, “do not apply to 
any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State 
and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service”. 
Although this aspect of the legal reform eliminates some major inconsistencies 
between Russian domestic legislation and international law of the sea, it creates a 
situation where the passage of foreign warships, or other ships enjoying sovereign 
immunity, is not regulated by the 2013 Rules. To some, such a situation amounts 
to a legal gap, which was supposed to be addressed by the adoption of specific 
regulation.22
2.1.2 Definition and boundaries
An important innovation brought by the 2012 Federal Law was a clear definition of 
the NSR. Article 5.1 of the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code defines it as:
[A] water area adjoining the northern coast of the Russian Federation, including internal 
waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian 
Federation, and limited in the East by the line delimiting the sea areas with the United 
States of America and by the parallel of the Dezhnev Cape in the Bering Strait; in 
the West, by the meridian of the Cape Zhelanie to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, by 
the east coastal line of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western limits of the 
Matochkin Shar, Kara Gates, Yugorski Shar Straits.
This definition determines the geographical scope of the NSR, including its lateral 
and outer limits. The clarification of the latter component is a particularly important 
novelty since the 1990 Regulations defined the NSR in such a way that the northern 
limits could extend beyond 200 nm from Russia’s baselines.23 As a consequence, the 
2013 Rules do not apply seaward of the outer limits of the Russian EEZ.24
2.1.3 Baselines
Russia’s Arctic maritime zones are measured from the baselines established by 
the USSR Council of Ministers on 15 January 1985.25 These include normal and 
straight baselines, but the latter enclose almost all crucial NSR straits. The interna-
tional legal validity of Russian Arctic baselines is not settled, as they are not always 
consistent with traditional criteria for the establishment of baselines.26 The United 
States (USA) objects to the characterization of “certain straits used for international 
navigation” as internal waters.27
There has been considerable attention to this issue throughout the 2010s. In 2010, 
Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development announced a tender on, among other 
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things, a scientific contribution to seek legal and historical justification for amend-
ments to Russia’s Arctic baselines.28 Then, the 2013 Arctic Development Strategy 
called for hydrographic work to determine the need for amendments to the list of 
geographical coordinates of the Arctic baselines.29 In the same vein, the 2015 Mari-
time Doctrine calls for the clarification of straight baselines along the Arctic coast.30 
These calls galvanized more specific discussions and undertakings, such as the assur-
ances coming from the Ministry of Defense to finalize the list of new baseline coor-
dinates by 2020, and extend the geographical scope of historic waters.31
Indeed, in March 2020, the Ministry of Defense completed and published a draft 
Decree.32 If adopted, it would supersede the 1985 Decree, and to that end, it includes 
a proposed complete list of coordinates for the measurement of Russian Arctic base-
lines. The explanatory note explains the need to enact a new list of coordinates due 
to, inter alia, the reality that 90% of points do not correspond to the current geo-
graphical situation.33 Notably, the proponents note that the adoption of the new list 
would allow Russia to extend its Arctic territorial sea by around 109000 km2 (size 
of Bulgaria), in addition to the possibility of extending the EEZ. The draft does not 
mention historic waters.34
2.1.4 Navigational rights and maritime zones
Russian legislation recognizes that the NSR consists of internal waters, territorial 
sea, a contiguous zone, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Moreover, it is not 
controversial or disputable that under international law, other States within the NSR 
enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and freedom of navigation 
in the EEZ. A somewhat more controversial issue arises concerning the applicable 
navigational rights through different straits enclosed within straight baselines.
These include the following straits: Matochkin Shar, Kara Gates, and Yugorskii 
Shar connecting the Barents Sea with the Kara Sea; the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Red 
Army, and Yungshturm Straits connecting the Kara and Laptev Seas; the Dimitri 
Laptev and Sannikov Straits connecting the Laptev and East Siberian Seas. The 
Long Strait, which connects the East Siberian and the Chukchi Seas, has not been 
enclosed with a straight baseline. 
Assuming, but only for the sake of argument, that Russian straight baselines are 
valid, the legal status of waters landward of baselines is that of internal waters. Under 
the law of the sea, there are three possible scenarios regarding applicable navigational 
rights in these waters. The first is that no right of navigation exists,35 the second is 
that innocent passage has been preserved, and the third is that at least some of these 
straits are subject to the right of transit passage. The latter is officially supported by 
the USA, which views the NSR to “include[s] straits used for international naviga-
tion; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits”.36
Since, except for the Baidaratskaya Bay, Russian straight baselines in the NSR 
do not delineate historic waters,37 innocent passage has been preserved in all of the 
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NSR straits.38 Further, it lies outside the scope of this article to determine whether 
any parts of the NSR should be subject to the regime of transit passage.39
Here, it is worth highlighting that Russian legislation is silent on the applicability 
of any navigational rights in areas enclosed by straight baselines. Paradoxically, while 
the Draft Resolution,40 represents an assertive move to express discontent about 
the potential operation of foreign warships in the NSR,41 it would also constitute 
Russia’s first explicit recognition that Article 8(2) of UNCLOS preserves the right of 
innocent passage in some unspecified parts of Russia’s internal waters in the NSR.
2.2 The prominence of international law in the domestic legal regime of the NSR
2.2.1 UNCLOS and the Polar Code
International law has featured more prominently in the domestic legal regime of the 
NSR over the last few years. Article 14 of the 1998 Federal Law on the IWTSCZ 
stipulates that navigation in the water area of the NSR “shall be carried out accord-
ing to generally recognised principles and norms of international law, international 
treaties of the Russian Federation, the present Federal Law, other federal laws and 
other normative legal acts issued in accordance to them.”
The international legal framework for the regulation of navigation consists pri-
marily of UNCLOS. The Convention allocates jurisdiction to States in their differ-
ent capacities as flag, coastal and port States, and in reference to different maritime 
zones and navigational rights. In the domain of shipping, UNCLOS usually leaves 
the matter of specific substantive rules and standards to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). To the extent rules and standards can be considered ‘generally 
accepted international rules and standards’ (GAIRS), they provide for a manda-
tory minimum for flag State jurisdiction and an optional maximum for coastal State 
jurisdiction.42 While much of the Polar Code can be regarded as GAIRS,43 it does 
not prejudice the applicability of UNCLOS,44 including Article 234.
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive and thorough 
analysis of this Arctic ‘lex specialis’. It suffices to underline that Article 234 is a 
unique clause, although not the only one in UNCLOS, which, owing to its ambigu-
ous language, managed to satisfy multiple delegations with divergent interests. The 
provision leaves extensive discretion to the coastal State to balance opposing inter-
ests, subject to unclear limitations, primarily the requirement to have due regard to 
navigation. At the same time, Article 234 includes normative standards that, in the 
event of dispute settlement, may be subject to interpretation by an international 
court or tribunal.
2.2.2 International legal basis for the 2013 Rules
It is remarkable that although Article 234 grants the coastal State additional and 
imprecisely limited powers, Russia was, for a long time, hesitant to link the specific 
requirements of its domestic NSR legal regime with this clause, at least explicitly.45 
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Neither Article 234 nor its domestic implementation – Article 32 of the 1998 
Federal Law on the EEZ – have been explicitly referenced in either the 2012 Federal 
Law or the 2013 Rules.46 
Moreover, in this context, some attention should be given to Article 14 of the 
1998 Federal Law on the IWTSCZ, which describes the NSR as a “historically 
developed national transport line of communication of the Russian Federation”. 
This ambiguous provision may appear to invoke some historic rights with respect to 
the NSR.47 The USA “does not consider such a term or concept to be established 
under international law”.48 
The NSR covers multiple maritime zones, with most located within the EEZ, 
where the 1998 Federal Law on the IWTSCZ does not apply. Further, a provision 
emphasizing the national status of the historically developed NSR in Russian law has 
never served as a legal basis for specific regulations,49 and there is no evidence it has 
ever been used as an argument to support any specific requirement. 
Rather, Article 14 of the 1998 Federal Law on the IWTSCZ presents symbolic 
recognition of the historical significance of the NSR to the entire nation and the 
great sacrifices that were made for its development.50 A reference to the historical 
development of a national route may assuage nationalistic sentiments domestically. 
At the same time, it involves little political cost when maintained alongside other 
arguments with a firmer basis in international law. 
It is, moreover, unlikely that Russia would be able to make a successful claim to 
historic rights concerning vast areas of the NSR. UNCLOS provides for a compre-
hensive legal regime for the oceans, addressing rights, obligations, and jurisdiction 
of States in maritime zones, including rights deriving from historical processes.51 
UNCLOS defines the scope and extent of maritime entitlements, which may not 
extend beyond the limits imposed in the Convention, and historic rights short of 
sovereignty must be compatible with the Convention. If a State enjoyed historic 
rights before accession to the Convention, they would be superseded if found to be 
in excess of the limits imposed by the Convention.52 
To be sure, the Arbitral Tribunal in the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration did not 
deny that historic waters can provide a State with broader rights than it would be 
entitled to under UNCLOS. However, Russia’s current historic waters claims within 
the NSR are relatively circumspect53 and, considering international protests, have 
not met with success. If Russia ever expands the scope of its historic waters claims, 
it is conceivable that further protests will follow.
Significant to determining Russia’s official position on the international legal basis 
for its coastal State jurisdiction on the NSR is the ANSR, which provided some 
clarification on the matter when it, for the fourth time, denied a permit to the Arctic 
Sunrise.54 As it turns out, when pressed, the Russian authorities referred to Arti-
cle 234 of UNCLOS, and not history, to justify Russia’s jurisdiction. In the note 
handed to the Arctic Sunrise and published on its website, the ANSR stated that the 
ship was refused a permit on the grounds that there had been a: 
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Violation of the Rules of navigation in the water area of the NSR, adopted and enforced 
by the Russian Federation in accordance with the article 234 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,— navigation in the water area of the Northern 
Sea Route from 24.08.2013 to 27.08.2013 without permission of the Northern Sea 
Route Administration, as well as taken actions in this [sic] creating potentially [sic] 
threat of marine pollution in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, ice-covered for 
most part of the year.55
This statement is particularly crucial as it came from the governmental body respon-
sible for the management of the NSR. One may compare this statement with the 
letter sent by the ANSR to another Greenpeace vessel – the Solo – in 1992, which 
entered the NSR without permission. In response, the ANSR referred exclusively 
to domestic legislation requiring a ship to seek permission and stipulated the con-
sequences of a violation, but it did not mention Article 234.56 In 2013, however, the 
ANSR deemed it necessary to refer to Article 234 explicitly. This appears to consti-
tute a development towards a clarification of Russia’s official position. It is evident 
that Article 234 of UNCLOS has provided support for domestic legislation applica-
ble to navigation on the NSR, and this reality has become more openly recognized 
in official statements.
2.2.3 Russian implementation of the Polar Code in its capacity as a coastal State
Not much appears to have happened as regards Russian implementation of the Polar 
Code in its capacity as a coastal State. While it is true that most of the Polar Code 
obligations are addressed to flag States, one would have expected Russia to have 
amended its 2013 Rules. The only amendment added was the requirement for ships 
to which the Polar Code applies to carry a copy of a Polar Ship Certificate.57
An interesting issue is that Item 65 of the 2013 Rules introduced a ban on the 
discharge of oil residues in the entire water area of the NSR before the Polar Code, 
Part II-A/Chapter 1/1.1.1, prohibited any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mix-
tures from any ship in the Arctic waters. On its face, the provision implements the 
ban on discharges in the Polar Code, but one should not forget, however, that Russia 
perceived such a ban as one of the most controversial issues during the Polar Code 
negotiations.58 It is curious that during these negotiations, Russia sought first to 
overturn the complete ban and, then, to seek exemptions from it, while already hav-
ing a similar requirement in its 2013 Rules.59




Article 5.1(4) of the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code stipulates that permits for nav-
igation on the NSR shall be issued on the condition that the vessel complies with 
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relevant requirements concerning safety of navigation and protection of the marine 
environment. Items 4 and 5 of the 2013 Rules specify what information is required 
from the applicant, namely:
• Information about the ship and its voyage according to Annex 1 of the 2013 
Rules;
• A copy of the classification certificate or ship’s letter;
• A copy of the tonnage certificate or ship’s letter;
• Copies of documents certifying the availability of insurance of civil liability for 
pollution damage or any other damage inflicted by the ship established by inter-
national treaties of the Russian Federation and Russian legislation (these include 
the Civil Liability Certificate (CLC) and the Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pol-
lution Damage Certificate (CLBC);
• For ships making a single passage, a copy of the certificate from the classification 
society approving such a single passage;
• For ships carrying out towing, a copy of the certificate from the classification 
society approving the project of towing; and
• For ships to which the Polar Code applies, a copy of a Polar Ship Certificate.60
The applicant is required to complete the Application for Admission to navigate in 
the Northern Sea Route Area and enclose information on the details of the ship, its 
name, IMO number and flag; details of the voyage, including the itinerary within 
the NSR and ports of call prior to entry to the NSR and after leaving the NSR; esti-
mated times of arrival in and departure from the NSR; information about the crew, 
passengers and cargo, including the type of cargo; details of the experience of the 
ship’s master in navigating the NSR; and details of the construction and design of 
the ship, its type, class notation, measurements, draught, and tonnage.61
The ANSR issues a permit based on an application transmitted electronically 
no earlier than 120 and no later than 15 days before planned entry.62 The ANSR 
responds within ten days of the application, and it publishes the decision on its web-
site.63 When the ANSR rejects an application, it is required to inform the applicant 
by email of the reasons for refusal.64 
The processing of the applications has become much more streamlined under the 
2013 Rules than before.65 However, a lingering and relevant question is: what exactly 
constitutes a reason for refusal? 
The scope of discretion of the ANSR in deciding on applications appears to be 
narrow, as it appears to be obliged to grant a permit once the ship has complied 
with the formal requirements. In summer (i.e., July to 15 November) any vessel can 
enter the NSR, provided they have managed to obtain relevant certificates, which are 
contingent on fulfilling substantive requirements. Outside this period, vessels need 
to have been granted a minimum ice class of Arc4.66 The legislation does not seem 
to allow the ANSR to deny a permit on other grounds – State security, for instance. 
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It is noteworthy that the 2018 draft amendments to the 2013 Rules proposed 
to complete Item 11 of the 2013 Rules by establishing specific conditions for the 
exercise of the right to refuse to issue a permit.67 These would explicitly limit the 
discretion of the NSR to verify whether an application is complete and accurate and 
whether the planned itinerary corresponds with what would be permissible accord-
ing to classification certificates, but the draft was not adopted. 
3.1.2 The practice of the ANSR regarding the issuance of permits between 2013–201968 
In 2013, 83 of the 718 applications did not obtain a permit on the first occasion. 65 
ships were granted a permit based on a revised application. Here attention is due 
the Arctic Sunrise, which was operated by Greenpeace International and classified 
by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) as an ‘Icebreaker’ and which, according to the DNV 
Rules (1973 Edition), was the second highest ice class at the time of construction. 
The ship applied for but was refused a permit to enter the NSR four times in a row. 
After the third refusal, the Arctic Sunrise entered the NSR without authorization.69 In 
response to the fourth application, the ANSR denied a permit to the Arctic Sunrise 
on the grounds of the previous violation of the 2013 Rules.70 



































In 2014, 30 of the 661 applications did not obtain a permit on the first occasion. 
24 ships were granted a permit based on a revised application. The ANSR expressly 
rejected only three of the remaining six applications with the other three applications 
The Northern Sea Route in the 2010s
393
being withdrawn by the applicants. The reasons for the rejections were: lacking 
approval from the class society for the single voyage, tonnage and class certificates, 
and completed annual surveys.
In 2015, 15 of the 701 applications did not obtain a permit on the first occasion. 
Out of these, six ships were granted a permit based on a revised application. The 
ANSR rejected the applications by some vessels (the Bahamian-flagged BGP Pros-
pector (Ice1), a Singaporean-flagged Geo Service 1 (no ice class), Russian-flagged 
vessel the Mariya (Ice1)) applying in October due to “dangerous conditions in 
November”. Two other applicants had withdrawn their applications, while one, Rus-
sian СПК-85, had already completed its voyage without a permit before applying for 
one. In response, the ANSR rejected the application. Of the remaining three, the first 
did not provide information about annual surveys for the previous two years; the sec-
ond did not provide a CLBC certificate, and the third’s intended area of operation 
exceeded the permissible area of operation under the classification certificate.
In 2016, only three of the 721 applications did not obtain a permit on the first 
occasion. Two of them were granted a permit based on a revised application. The 
reason for the rejection of the application for the Nikolay Trubyatchinsky and the 
Sleipner was due to the same error. Namely, a different ship-owner in the application 
form and the attachment, and the fact that no name of the classification society was 
indicated. Once they corrected their application forms, these two vessels obtained 
permits. One vessel, the Sakhalin, did not apply again. 
Interestingly, before it submitted its application, the Sakhalin had been reported 
by the ANSR for violating the 2013 Rules, as it had navigated in the NSR without 
a permit. When it later applied for a permit, the refusal was not grounded on prior 
violation but the failure to attach a copy of the tonnage certificate to the application. 
After the application was turned down, the vessel was again found navigating the 
NSR without a permit. Information about the violations was listed on the ANSR 
website.
In 2017, two of the 664 applications did not obtain a permit on the first occasion. 
The reason for one rejection was a lack of information about the annual survey, 
while the reason for the other rejection was based on the absence of a copy of a 
classification certificate. Both applicants were granted a permit based on a revised 
application.
In 2018, 16 of 808 applications were rejected. Of these rejections, one was sub-
sequently annulled, nine ships successfully submitted revised applications, and six 
ships did not submit a revised application. Common grounds for refusal included 
lacking copies of documents, including the most recently required Polar Ship Certif-
icate (the possession of which was verified for foreign and Russian ships), the ship’s 
letter, as well as inadequate information in the submitted forms.
In 2019, two of 801 applications were rejected due to the absence of copies of 




An analysis of the practice of the ANSR reveals that when the ANSR considers 
applications for navigation on the NSR, it acts transparently and predictably. Most 
applications obtain permits on the first occasion. When rejected, most applicants 
submit revised applications and receive a permit. The number of refusals was lowest 
in 2016 and 2017, rising slightly in 2018, likely as a result of the entry into force of 
new amendments to the 2013 Rules, to drop again in 2019.71 This trend indicates 
that the practice of the ANSR has become predictable and that interested companies 
learn how to file a correct application.
With regard to the process, the ANSR has consistently rejected applications based 
on their incompleteness. The usual reasons for rejections include lacking copies 
of documents, formal mistakes in the application forms or inconsistencies in the 
planned itinerary with the operational limits determined based on relevant certifi-
cates, and the matrix of admissibility criteria from Annex 2 to the 2013 Rules. All 
such refusals, except the refusal of the fourth application of the Arctic Sunrise, find 
support in the 2013 Rules. 
Interestingly, apart from the Arctic Sunrise, the ANSR never again used a prior vio-
lation of the 2013 Rules as grounds on which to reject an application, even though 
there were many instances where applicants obtained a permit despite having been 
previously identified for non-compliance by the ANSR. There are examples where 
the ANSR could have raised this issue, but did not. The abovementioned Sakhalin 
was refused a permit on different grounds in 2016, with no mention of previous vio-
lations. An example from 2017 is the Maltese-flagged Bozdag, which navigated after 
its permit had expired. After having been reported by the ANSR for a violation of the 
2013 Rules on the website, it applied for and obtained a permit the very same day.
Another interesting example was the Russian-flagged Kapitan Belodvortsev, clas-
sified as Ice1. In 2014, it was first refused a permit, on the grounds that the ship 
had been decommissioned. It obtained a permit later in 2014 upon submission of 
a revised application. In 2015, it got a permit but entered the NSR without waiting 
for it. That the ANSR had reported it for a violation of the 2013 Rules did not pre-
vent the ship from obtaining a permit. Later the same year, it was found navigating 
the NSR after its permit had expired, and in 2016 it did not bother applying for a 
permit at all – which did not prevent the ship from navigating the NSR twice that 
year. The ANSR noted all these violations on its website. Along these lines, one can 
also mention the Boris Vilkitsky, which in 2018 was noted for “gross violation” of the 
2013 Rules, but later obtained three new permits.72
If no permit is granted in the first instance, one in principle needs to send a revised 
application. However, the second application does not differ from submitting addi-
tional information as it is done online, using email and pdf scans of documents, 
and sometimes it takes as little as one day to get a permit in the second instance. 
Moreover, the ANSR often allows the validity of the permit to be prolonged without 
having to file a separate application. The decision about prolongation is made public, 
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but no separate application is registered. Also, the practice has been to grant permits 
for the entire navigational season, rather than single voyages.73 The length of the per-
mit’s validity is limited by the applicant’s intent, the validity of relevant certificates, 
and the terms of access to different areas depending on the ice class of the vessel, 
period of navigation, and ice conditions.
The flag of the vessel seems to play little or no role, as both Russian and foreign 
flags appear to be granted or refused permits in equal manner. The lack of a suitable 
ice class is generally not a problem if the ship indicates details of its voyage itinerary, 
which is consistent with the area of operation indicated in the relevant ship certifi-
cates.
3.2 Fees for services
3.2.1 Previous practice, controversies, and ideas
Russia’s policy on NSR fees suffered much turbulence in the aftermath of the disso-
lution of the USSR and the shift from a centrally-planned to a market-driven econ-
omy. The cost of services, together with the already massive expenditures related to 
activities in harsh northern conditions and remote areas, have often been singled out 
as a critical factor hindering significant interest in navigating the NSR.
To appreciate the change brought about by the adoption of the 2012 Federal Law, 
it is important to briefly address the previous Russian practice on NSR fees. Under 
the 1990 Regulations and related enactments, a controversial issue was whether it 
was possible to use the NSR without having to pay any fees. The critical element of 
that discussion was the specification of the services for which a fee was charged. 
3.2.2 Fees for what? Icebreaker assistance and ice pilotage.
Under Item 1.4 of the 1996 Regulations for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels 
through the NSR and Item 7.4 of the 1990 Regulations, the West or East Marine 
Operations Headquarters (MOHs) were entitled to prescribe one of five types of 
“guiding” (namely, shore-based, aircraft, conventional or icebreaker guiding, or ice-
breaker assisted pilotage) to ensure maritime safety and provide favorable conditions 
for navigation. In effect, a vessel was under the constant control of the MOHs, which 
had full discretion to prescribe a ‘service’. Obligatory icebreaking assistance, unre-
lated to actual navigational conditions, was established in the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, 
Dmitry Laptev, and Sannikov Straits.74 This created some ambiguity regarding the 
basis for the calculation of fees. Russian courts failed to adjudicate disagreements 
on the interpretation and application of the relevant rules in a consistent manner.75 
Currently, there is no such blanket requirement to use Russian services of ice-
breaker assistance or ice pilotage. After receiving the application for the permit 
to navigate the NSR, the ANSR indicates whether the vessel is entitled to navi-
gate independently or only under icebreaker assistance. The ANSR does not have 
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full discretion to prescribe icebreaker assistance, as the decision must be based on 
Annex 2 of the 2013 Rules.
The 2013 Rules provide specific rules for ice pilotage,76 but they fail to clarify 
under which conditions, if ever, ice pilotage is mandatory. Annex 1 to the 2013 
Rules, in Point 13, includes a requirement to indicate “information on the length of 
experience of the ship master of the navigation in ice in the water area of the North-
ern Sea Route (…)”.
This may suggest that lack of sufficient experience should lead the ship to deploy 
an ice pilot. Milaković et al. note that a requirement to take on board an ice pilot 
is stated in a permit.77 However, the practice of the ANSR in the issuance of the 
permits has been to indicate whether and where the ship is permitted to navigate 
independently or under icebreaker assistance.78 Also, the ANSR has never raised the 
issue of navigating without an ice pilot as a violation of the 2013 Rules in its overview 
published on the website. It cannot be precluded that the ANSR recommends the 
use of ice pilotage to individual applicants in direct communication. 
3.2.3 The methodology of the determination of the fees
Under the 1990 Regulations, the fees resembled taxes rather than fees for services. 
For example, a ship carrying cars was charged sixteen times more than a ship carry-
ing wood. Also, during preparation of the 2012 Federal Law, the idea of a tonnage 
due was considered79 but eventually rejected.
The 2012 Federal Law introduced the central principle for the calculation of fees. 
Article 5.1(5) of the 1999 Merchant Shipping Code, as amended, states that “the 
payment for icebreaker assistance and ice pilotage in the water area of the Northern 
Sea Route shall be effected based on the amount of service actually delivered”, with 
due regard to “the capacity of a vessel, its ice class, the distance of icebreaker assis-
tance and ice pilotage and the period of navigation”. 
The primary rationale behind the amendments to the 1995 Federal Law on 
Natural Monopolies was to provide the State with regulatory tools to prevent market 
anomalies in the context of a natural monopoly, such as the regulation of prices or 
tariffs.
These amendments lay down a framework for further development by more spe-
cific subsidiary acts. In furtherance of the two principles – that the fees are to cor-
respond with the service actually rendered, and that the State can determine tariffs 
for the calculation of fees – the Federal Service for Tariffs adopted two Orders on 
4 March 2014. 
The 2014 Order on Tariffs sets out the general framework for the calculation of 
fees.80 Items 4 to 7 of the 2014 Order on Tariffs specify how to determine the key 
elements for the calculation of fees, such as the ‘capacity of a vessel’, the ‘ice class of 
a vessel’, the ‘distance of icebreaker assistance and ice pilotage’, and the ‘period of 
navigation’. 
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The 2014 Order on Tariffs for Atomflot establishes a ceiling for fees, expressed 
in monetary terms, but only for icebreaker assistance rendered by Atomflot.81 It 
establishes specific tariffs for the calculation of fees based on the following factors: 
gross tonnage, the period of navigation, ice class, and the number of zones. The tar-
iffs are meant to be set at a maximum level that Atomflot can charge, but Atomflot 
is allowed to apply the tariffs at lower levels (i.e., apply discounts). At the moment, 
other organizations that provide icebreaker assistance are not bound by any Govern-
mental enactment setting maximum tariffs and are relatively free to negotiate fees 
with their customers.
The fine-tuning of the Russian policy and legislation on fees is not over. There has 
been some legislative activity to specify the duties of natural monopoly entities, such 
as to keep separate accounting of income and expenses related to the provision of 
icebreaking assistance and ice pilotage.82
3.2.4 Summary
Summing up, Russian policy and practice regarding NSR fees has seen significant 
adjustments over the years. From the perspective of the law of the sea, changing the 
main principle for the calculation of fees so that they correspond with the service 
rendered is of paramount significance. At the same time, this principle will be moot 
unless more specific regulations follow. For now, it appears that the most recent 
developments aim to increase transparency in the NSR fee system, especially those 
fees charged by Atomflot. However, the transparency of the entire system has been 
compromised to a large extent by the ability of the providers of icebreaker assistance 
to apply discounts – as is the case with Atomflot – and the relatively unconstrained 
discretion to calculate fees by all other organizations.
3.3 Enforcement of non-compliance
Unlike the 1990 Regulations, which included a clause explicitly providing for the 
expulsion of vessels in cases of non-compliance with the Regulations,83 the 2013 
Rules are silent on enforcement actions. As such, there remains some uncertainty 
over procedures to enforce non-compliance with the different requirements of the 
2013 Rules. This article does not aim to discuss the arcane features of Russian law 
regarding administrative or criminal offenses. Suffice it to say that the operation of 
a Russian-flagged vessel is subject to a broad scope of Russian law, and hence, the 
owner, the operator, or the crew of an unseaworthy vessel may be deemed to have 
breached different rules. 
Common practice, at least in the period between 2014 and 2018, was that when 
the ANSR identified non-compliance, it published information about the inci-
dent on its website, and informed the Federal Service for Supervision of Transport 
(Rostransnadzor) about the incident.84 These incidents did not involve much at-sea 
enforcement, rather they entailed an administrative investigation combined with the 
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imposition of penalties after non-compliance was ascertained. The penalties can be 
strikingly insignificant both for Russian-flagged85 and for foreign-flagged vessels.86 
The remainder of this Section aims to analyze the incidents of non-compliance by 
foreign ships, relying on information available in the public domain.87 
Since 2013, the Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands);88 the Qingdao China (UK); the 
Bozdag (Malta);89 the Ice Eagle (Liberia); the Audax (Netherlands); the Dyn-
amogracht (Netherlands); the Pomor (Liberia); the Normann (Liberia); the Sleipner 
(Saint Vincent and Grenadines); and the Boris Vilkitsky (Cyprus) have been noted by 
the ANSR for non-compliance.90 
Most frequently the violations concerned reporting obligations (Items 14, 16, 19, 
or 20 of the 2013 Rules), as committed by the Qingdao China, Sleipner, Pomor, Nor-
mann, Dynamogracht, Audax and Ice Eagle. There is no information available about 
the consequences of these violations, except the information about non-compliance 
on the ANSR website. 
The incident involving the Boris Vilkitsky warrants separate attention. The tanker 
was due to serve in Russia’s Arctic flagship project – Yamal LNG – operated by the 
joint venture of Novatek, Total, CNPC and the Silk Road Fund. On 12 April 2018, 
the ANSR noted that the Boris Vilkitsky had entered the NSR area on 9 April 2018 
in violation of the 2013 Rules.91 The Boris Vilkitsky was classified as an Arc7 vessel, 
a classification granted by the Russian Maritime Register and Bureau Veritas. How-
ever, due to a malfunction in the ship’s stern thruster and port steering column, 
information given by Bureau Veritas on 30 March 2018, the Russian Maritime Reg-
ister recalculated the vessel’s ice class to Arc4. As a result, the Boris Vilkitsky was 
not – in line with Annex 2 of the 2013 Rules – allowed to enter and navigate, even 
with icebreaker assistance, in the southwestern Kara Sea, where the official ice con-
ditions of 23 March 2018 were described as ‘medium’. According to the ANSR, 
the entry and operation of the ship as well as the lack of information transmitted – 
required under Item 19 of the 2013 Rules – constituted a “gross violation of the 
2013 Rules”.
It is not clear whether any investigation followed or whether any penalties were 
issued in response to the violation. The ship completed its voyage to Sabetta on 
12 April 2018 and was later detained by the Russian Coast Guard before it was 
permitted to leave on 21 April under icebreaker assistance.92 In the meantime, the 
ship applied for a new permit on 17 April 2018, based on its then notation of Arc4. 
The permit was granted on 19 April 2018. After the ship recovered its Arc7 ice class, 
it applied on 29 May 2018 and obtained a new permit valid until 3 February 2019. 
Interestingly, the incident prompted President Putin to comment that: “It is essential 
only that there are less unsubstantiated pretexts for restraining development. (…) 
either they do not allow gas carriers into the port under pretenses, then they do not 
let them depart, but we will deal with this separately, I have not interfered so far”.93
Against this background, it is evident that the Boris Vilkitsky situation reflects a sig-
nificant conflict of interests, with potential repercussions for the future shape of the 
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legal regime. The incident with the Boris Vilkitsky took place in the context of a larger 
power struggle over the NSR between the Ministry of Transport, on the one hand, 
and Atomflot and Novatek, on the other.94 An interesting follow-up to this situation 
was the proposal by the Ministry of Transport to soften NSR ice class requirements. 
If adopted, this would allow ships with ice classes Arc4 and Arc5 to navigate the 
NSR during the winter season.95 The draft amendments to the 2013 Rules proposed, 
among other things, a new subdivision of the NSR into 28 sections (as opposed to 
current subdivision into seven sections), but the document was never adopted.96
In conclusion, for most of the decade, there were signs of goodwill to increase trans-
parency in dealing with non-compliance with the 2013 Rules. Although there was 
the recognition that the capacity to enforce all violations needed improvement, the 
ANSR closely monitored all shipping movements on the NSR and flagged instances 
of non-compliance by both Russian and foreign ships. The lack of precise rules and 
procedures for enforcement still constitutes a legal gap that most likely exists due 
to the relative infancy of the NSR legal regime, a gap that is expected to be filled at 
some point.97 At the same time, an important negative development occurred in the 
aftermath of the Boris Vilkitsky incident. Since the incident, the ANSR has stopped 
publishing any information about violations of the 2013 Rules. This can be consid-
ered a setback regarding transparency and predictability in the application process, 
and the development of law applicable to the NSR.
4 Protectionist measures and security concerns
Liberalization, in the sense of making it more attractive for ships to use the NSR, and 
acceptance of the constraints imposed by the international law of the sea, have led to 
a resurgence in economic protectionism and national security concerns.
4.1 Protectionist measures
There have been a series of protectionist measures taken to support the Russian 
shipping industry as well as the shipbuilding industry. First, Federal law No. 460-FZ, 
29 December 2017, introduced an obligation to use Russian-flagged ships for cab-
otage and transport of hydrocarbons (oil, LNG and coal) loaded within the NSR,98 
subject to permitted exemptions.99 These measures depend on the sovereignty of 
Russia in ports, and as such, they do not raise much controversy for consistency with 
UNCLOS. 
A more controversial issue relates to Item 21 of the 2013 Rules, which stipulates 
that only icebreakers registered in Russia are entitled to provide icebreaker assis-
tance. This means that a foreign icebreaker can use the NSR but cannot provide 
icebreaker assistance to other vessels navigating within the NSR.
In the EEZ, ships enjoy freedom of navigation, including other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms. There is little doubt that this free-
dom would cover the right to navigate with the assistance of icebreakers under a 
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flag of preference. Moreover, one of the most profound limitations to coastal State 
powers under Article 234 is the duty of non-discrimination. A requirement to have a 
Russian flag on board an icebreaker that can render icebreaker assistance appears to 
constitute discrimination unless there are valid reasons for such regulation. Russian 
legislation allows different companies to render the service, without any rationaliza-
tion of the requirement to have a Russian flag. As such, the Russian requirement to 
use a Russian-flagged icebreaker for assistance in the EEZ does not find support in 
UNCLOS. 
4.2 Security considerations
It is not surprising that increased attention on the Arctic, by Russian and foreign 
actors, places a spotlight on security considerations.100 To be sure, security consid-
erations may often play a role in decision-making without being explicitly and pub-
licly disclosed. One example that immediately comes to mind is the permit scheme, 
discussed above in Section 3.1, where the idea behind it may have been formed 
predominantly by security considerations. 
The liberalization and increasing appreciation of UNCLOS in the Arctic can and 
has led to tensions related to security. One such example was triggered by the pas-
sage of the French Navy’s offshore support and assistance vessel, the Rhône (A603), 
which passed through the entire NSR without warning in September 2018.101
In response, Mikhail Mizintsev, the Head of the Russian National Defense Man-
agement Center, pledged that by the start of the 2019 navigational season, foreign 
warships would only be able to navigate the NSR following prior notification.102 
According to his statement, new legislative developments were supposed to fill the 
legal vacuum regarding the use of the NSR. In March 2019, a Draft Resolution of 
the Government of Russia was prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defence and 
published on the website of the Government.103 
The draft would require foreign warships and other vessels operated by a State 
and used on non-commercial service that exercise the right of innocent passage:
• to use the service of mandatory ice pilotage;
• to use icebreaker assistance in the territorial sea and internal waters of the NSR 
if necessary. 
It would also require the flag State to submit a notification concerning the planned 
passage through the territorial sea of the Russian Federation in the NSR no later 
than 45 days before the start of the proposed passage.
Besides, the draft proposes that foreign warships exercising innocent passage 
“must have the necessary ice construction, observe special precautionary measures 
and comply with the requirements relating to the safety of navigation and protection 
of the marine environment from pollution from ships (as applicable to the waters of 
the Northern Sea Route).”
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In the end, neither the threat voiced by Mizintsev nor the more specific draft leg-
islation materialized. The impression is that the primary purpose of the draft was to 
send a strong political signal to deter further challenge to Russia’s somewhat ambig-
uous claims. Even without having been signed, the draft received much publicity 
in Russian and foreign media, at times even creating the wrong impression that it 
has entered into force.104 One also recalls the statement by the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov, who at the 
meeting with foreign military attachés said, “[O]ur Armed Forces can fully ensure 
the safety of navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, and therefore there 
is no need to find warships of other countries in this sea corridor”.105 
In any event, the adoption of such regulations would undoubtedly be highly con-
troversial and unlikely to garner international recognition. This is most likely, or at 
least partially, the reason that the resolution was never signed.
5 The Polar Silk Road 
It is highly revealing that any discussion on the NSR without reference to China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would appear incomplete. The grand vision of the 
BRI, described as “the largest coordinated infrastructure initiative in the history of 
the world”,106 was first officially proposed in 2013.107 It includes the land-based “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”.108 Four years 
later the latter was extended to the Arctic as the Polar Silk Road (PSR).109 China’s 
2018 Arctic Policy commits the BRI to bring opportunities for parties to facilitate 
connectivity and sustainable development of the Arctic, and jointly build a PSR 
through developing the Arctic shipping routes.110
Whatever the implications of this initiative,111 China stands as the main potential 
foreign benefactor of the NSR, and it has indicated its interests relatively clearly.112 
Notably, both Russia and China embrace UNCLOS as the common framework for 
their interaction regarding the Arctic and the NSR.113 Moreover, China’s statements 
are carefully vague, neither contradicting nor condoning Russia’s specific require-
ments or position.114 For now, one may only assume China’s potential dissatisfaction 
with some elements of Russian practice resulting from Russia’s interpretation of the 
law of the sea, such as the mandatory permit scheme, icebreaker monopoly or possi-
ble discriminatory practice. Time will show to what extent the position of these two 
States coincide and to what extent potential differences on some principled issues 
will matter for the functionality of the NSR/PSR. 
6 The way ahead
Over the last decade, the political course to liberalize the legal regime applicable to 
navigation in the NSR has been relatively stable. Also, in principle, there has been 
a stable trend to appreciate the limitations imposed by UNCLOS. This is not to 
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conclude that the practice of Russia in the NSR is fully consistent with UNCLOS. 
It is evident that there has been significant improvement in terms of the consis-
tency of Russian legislation with international law. Continuing controversies relate 
to some ‘old’ practices, rather than to any new claims. For instance, the controver-
sial requirement of prior authorization, or the requirement to use a Russian-flagged 
icebreaker for assistance have been retained through the legislative reform, rather 
than introduced as part of that reform. Here it should be emphasized that the draft 
legislation aiming to introduce specific requirements for sovereign immune ves-
sels would essentially have reintroduced requirements that applied to such vessels 
before 2012. Among other setbacks, transparency regarding enforcement of non- 
compliance has dropped rather than risen. Likewise, in individual instances, Russia 
has acted more assertively than before. The expulsion of the Arctic Sunrise from the 
Kara Sea contrasts with a more tolerant approach towards vessels navigating in the 
EEZ in the past.115 
Another observation relates to the prevalence of the de facto state of affairs over a 
more sophisticated situation de jure. Russian reliance on ambiguous policy tools, in 
addition to the extreme climactic conditions in the Arctic, has discouraged indepen-
dent use and the assertion of navigational rights and freedoms by foreigners. This 
allowed Russia to exercise de facto control over the NSR. Now, despite the trends 
discussed above, the permit scheme, the monopoly on icebreaker assistance, new 
restrictions on the transportation of hydrocarbons and cabotage, plans to establish 
transport hubs in Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamtchatsky,116 and further con-
solidation of Atomflot as the single logistics operator may all lead to cementing the 
status quo of the NSR as primarily a national line of communication in the Arctic. 
The emergence of the PSR may mark a potential qualitative change in the state of 
affairs, although of a de facto rather than de jure character. If viewed through a supply 
chain lens, the functionality of the PSR would only partially depend on navigational 
rights and freedoms. Successful supply chains can thrive regardless of the applicable 
navigational rights. The BRI, with its Silk Road Economic Belt spanning across land 
territories and utilizing current or future canals, is a good example. China’s leverage 
over the PSR may be a result of its position as a potential source of capital invest-
ments and loans for infrastructure development, as well as China’s significance as 
the destination market for energy products. If the PSR turns into a ‘stable’, ‘attrac-
tive’ or ‘useful’ supply chain for China, it may continue to function without the need 
to resolve all the underlying political or legal disputes, at least for some time.
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NOTES
 1. The text of the Polar Code is available in IMO Doc MEPC 68/21/Add.1, 5 June 2015, 
Annex 10, in force 1 January 2017.
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the USSR/Russia’s de facto control over the NSR to a peculiar amalgamate of policies and 
practices in addition to the prevalent harsh natural conditions. These include restrictions on 
cabotage, problematic interpretation of innocent passage, straight baselines and measures 
with the official purpose of ensuring maritime safety and environmental protection.
 7. E. Franckx and L. Boone, ‘New Developments in the Arctic: Protecting the Marine Envi-
ronment from Increased Shipping’ in M. H. Nordquist, J. N. Moore, A. H. A. Soons and 
Hak-So Kim (eds), The Law of the Sea Convention: US Accession and Globalization (Maurtinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2012) pp. 188–190.
 8. The ‘Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, Approved by President of the 
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin’, 30 November 2016, <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_
policy/official_documents>, all internet links in this article were accessed 03 September 
2020, refers, in para 76, to the significance of using the NSR as Russia’s national transport 
route in the Arctic, as well as for transit shipments between Europe and Asia. See also 
V. Putin, ‘Speech at the International Arctic Forum: The Arctic – Territory of Dialogue’, 
Arkhangelsk, (22 September 2011) <http://archive.government.ru/eng/docs/16536/>ø 
and similar remarks in V. Putin, ‘Poslaniye Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu [Pres-
ident’s Address to the Federal Assembly]’ (1 March 2018) <http://kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/56957/work>, where he expressed an expectation that the volume of traffic 
on the NSR will grow by up to 80 million tons by 2025 and reiterated the aspiration to turn 
the NSR into a global, competitive shipping route. The President’s Address to the Federal 
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programme of the Research Council of Norway through support for the research 
project Regulating shipping in Russian Arctic Waters: Between international law, 
national interests and geopolitics, project no. 287576. The publication charges for 




Assembly was followed by the 2018 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, on 
National Goals and Strategic Challenges of the Development of the Russian Federation for 
the Period to 2024, No. 204, 7 May 2018, <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/43027>, formalizing 
the objectives and tasks for the Government to adopt a comprehensive plan of moderniza-
tion and development of infrastructure, including development of the NSR aiming at an 
increase of cargo turnover to 80 million tons. This, if materialized, would mean a roughly 
eightfold increase compared with the volume of traffic in 2017.
 9. The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until 2020, 7 June 2001.
 10. The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 26 July 2015.
 11. The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period until 
2020, 18 September 2008.
 12. The Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic Zone until 2020, 20 February 2013.
 13. The Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035, 6 March 
2020.
 14. The most recent 2020 Basics of Arctic Policy, ibid., identifies “the development of the NSR 
as internationally competitive national transport communication line of the Russian Feder-
ation” as one of the key national interests in the Arctic.
 15. Federal Law on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Con-
cerning the State Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the NSR, 28 July 
2012, No. 132 FZ, SZRF, 30 July 2012 No. 31 p. 4321.
 16. Federal Law on Natural Monopolies, 17 August 1995, No. 147 FZ., SZRF, 21 August 1995, 
No. 34 p. 3426.
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 19. Set up by the Order of the Government of Russian Federation № 358-p, 15 March 2013, 
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 20. Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, as approved by the order 
of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, 17 January 2013 No. 7, (2013 Rules).
 21. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3.
 22. See the discussion in Section 4.2.
 23. Pursuant to Item 1.2 of the 1990 Regulations, they are applied in Russia’s maritime zones 
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